Are There Asymmetries In The Effects Of Training On The Conditional Male Wage Distribution? by Mark Bryan et al.
Are there Asymmetries in the Effects of Training  




+, Alison L Booth









We use a quantile regression framework to investigate the degree to which work-
related training affects the location, scale and shape of the conditional wage distribution. 
Human capital theory suggests that the percentage returns to training investments will be the 
same across the conditional wage distribution. Other theories – whether based on 
imperfections in the labour market or on skill-mix heterogeneity – suggest that this need not 
be the case.  Using the first six waves of the European Community Household Panel, we 
investigate these issues for private sector men in ten European Union countries. Our results 
show that, for the vast majority of countries, investment in training yields similar percentage 
returns across the conditional wage distribution. Only Belgium was an outlier in this respect. 
However, our results do indicate that there are considerable differences in mean returns to 
training across countries.   
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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
The mean returns to various forms of human capital have been extensively investigated in 
the labour economics literature, especially the returns to formal education and work-related 
training. Relatively recently, attention has shifted to investigating the degree to which 
education might be associated with more complex changes in the conditional wage 
distribution, and what these associations say about movements in wage inequality and 
differing returns to education.
1 In this paper we utilize the quantile regression (QR) 
framework to investigate the extent to which private sector training affects the location, scale 
and shape of the conditional wage distribution, and investigate whether or not these patterns 
are consistent with various alternative models of training investment and labour market 
structures. Using the first six waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), 
we carry out this analysis for private sector men in ten European Union countries.
 2   
There are a number of economic variables that are not typically available in micro 
data sets but that can affect wages. Examples are unobserved ‘ability’, unmeasured 
components of human capital formation such as informal training giving rise to productivity 
differences, and labour market structures like monopsony. They can explain why there is still 
a wide dispersion of wages even after conditioning on a range of observable human capital 
characteristics. For example, in our analysis, we condition on the initial wage and a set of 
other firm-specific, job-specific and personal characteristics including accumulated training.  
We hypothesise that the dispersion of conditional wages is caused by differing rates of 
unmeasured, informal skill accumulation; differences in the specific-general mix of these 
skills; individual-specific productivity; and differing market structures. In contrast to 
                                                 
1    For surveys of studies estimating the mean returns to education and training, see Ashenfelter and Card 
(2001) and Ashenfelter and RJ Lalonde (1996). Studies estimating the returns to education using quantile 
regression techniques include Arias, Hallock and Sosa-Escudero (2001) and Gonzales and Miles (2001).   
2   To our knowledge there are no studies investigating how training affects the conditional wage distribution, 
although there has been a recent surge in the estimation of wage equations using quantile regression 
techniques (see Fitzenberger, et al, 2001, for some applications of quantile regression techniques.  Training and Wages 
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conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques, QR methods allow for flexible 
interactions between these unobservable factors and observable wage determinants. If the 
observed determinants of wages, such as training, interact with the unobservables in a non-
trivial way – for example, if monopsony affects the returns to training – then an exogenous 
shift in training may affect the scale and shape, as well as the location, of the conditional 
distribution.
3 
4 While OLS allows a locational shift only, QR provides a fuller view of these 
effects. We now discuss some reasons why we may or may not expect human capital effects 
to differ across the conditional wage distribution. 
In a perfectly competitive labour market, there are good reasons to expect that 
percentage returns to investment in similar forms of human capital might be the same across 
the conditional wage distribution.. If capital and labour markets function according to the 
competitive paradigm and if human capital is general, then any individual investment in 
human capital should yield equal percentage returns across the conditional wage distribution.  
However, there are several arguments suggesting that this might not be the case.  
First, if there are significant complementarities between unobservable ability and 
education, then higher ability individuals – further to the right in the conditional wage 
distribution – might have higher returns to education. This has been found in a study by 
Arias, Hallock and Sosa-Escudero, 2001. If this argument also applies to work-related 
                                                 
3   In order to difference out the effects of unobserved individual effects in standard linear panel data models 
it is assumed that they enter the equation additively. In contrast, here we assume that the unobservables 
enter via interactions with the other covariates.  As in the standard linear panel data model, the assumption 
that the overall equation error is uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneity and included covariates is 
maintained here. 
4   Quantile regression allows identification of the returns to training in the sense that it provides a picture of 
how the conditional distribution varies with training. For example, a positive coefficient on the training 
variable in a 10
th percentile regression would indicate that an increment of training is associated with an 
upward movement in the 10
th percentile of the conditional wage distribution. This coefficient, which is the 
derivative of the conditional quantile function, is the estimated return. The models we sketch out in the text 
imply certain patterns of estimated returns, and we test whether the data are consistent with these. Without 
such priors it is difficult to make inferences about the wages of given individuals based on QR coefficients 
(for example, one cannot say whether an individual at the 10
th percentile in the absence of training would 
remain at the 10
th percentile if they received training). 
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training, there will be an upward sloping profile when we graph the training effect across 
quantiles of the conditional wage distribution, because of ability (an unobservable 
individual-specific effect that may interact with training differentially across the conditional 
wage distribution).  
Second, any variations in the returns to training across the conditional wage 
distribution might reflect heterogeneity in the mix of skills that are embodied in training.  In 
particular, as suggested by Stevens (1994) and Lazear (2003), some firms might offer skills 
packages – comprising both formal and informal training – that are more specific than 
others. Training that is specific and partially firm-financed will produce lower individual 
wage returns than self-financed general training. We can measure the more formal types with 
our training measure and on-the-job training with our tenure measure. But, as noted above, 
there may still be some types of informal training that we are unable to capture with our 
controls and a heterogeneous specific-general mix will add to the conditional dispersion of 
wages. If there are complementarities between formal and informal training, we would find 
that the estimated formal training effects on wages should increase as we move up the 
conditional wage distribution. Workers to the left of the conditional wage distribution will be 
those who have received training that is specific and partially firm-financed. Those to the 
right may have received general training. But here the reason will be due to unobservable 
firm-specific effects rather than individual-specific effects.  
Third, if the labour market is not everywhere perfectly competitive, there could also 
be varying returns to training across the conditional wage distribution. A number of recent 
papers suggest that labour market imperfections might lead firms to finance general training 
(Stevens, 1994; Acemoglu and Piscke, 1999; Booth and Zoega, 1999). This will be the case 
wherever a worker’s productivity is increasing at a faster rate than wages. To the extent that 
this ‘wedge’ is unobservable in survey data, we might expect to see variations from the Training and Wages 
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average returns to training across different quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. 
These will reflect unobservable differences in the degree of imperfect competition and in the 
extent to which firms have financed individuals’ training and are reaping the returns.  
For example, workers subject to greater monopsony power will have lower than 
expected wages, and the firm will take a larger share of the returns to any training. 
Therefore, the estimated training effects on wages should increase as we move up the 
conditional wage distribution. Intuitively this is because by definition monopsony power is 
associated with lower wages. As this power declines, not only will trained workers finance 
more of their training and thus reap greater returns, but untrained workers will be paid more 
as monopsony power declines and we move up the conditional wage distribution. However, 
such effects might not appear as unobservable, since imperfect competition in the labour 
market might by proxied by industry dummies. Moreover, since we are analysing men, the 
usual monopsony arguments - that are arguably more likely to apply to women constrained 
by family circumstances - may not be relevant, although Manning (2003) suggests otherwise. 
Finally, some firms – for instance those with better human resource management - 
might simply offer better quality work-related training than other firms as well as pay higher 
wages. Workers to the left of the conditional wage distribution will be those in the lower 
quality firms and that is why both training returns and the untrained wage are lower. Those 
to the right are in the better quality firms. In this case there will be again be an upward 
sloping profile when we graph the training effect across quantiles of the conditional wage 
distribution and here the reason will also be unobservable firm-specific effects.   
These various hypotheses are hard to test with available data. Ideally we would like 
linked employer-employee data in order to control for individual- and firm-specific 
unobservable and observable effects.
5 However, in this paper we take a first step towards 
                                                 
5   However, even this type of data will typically not have information on productivity. Training and Wages 
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investigating these issues by analysing the impact of work-related training on the conditional 
wage distribution using QR techniques for a sample of individual-level data. A related goal 
is to see how these training effects differ across European Union (EU) countries.
6  
 
2. THE  ECONOMETRIC  MODEL 
 
There is now an extensive literature that estimates the impact of training on expected wages 
using a linear regression framework (see inter alia references in Ashenfelter and Lalonde, 
1996; and Arulampalam and Booth, 2001). Here, we deviate from this common practice by 
looking at the effects of training and other covariates on different quantiles of the log wage 
distribution.
7 The main advantage of a quantile regression (QR) framework is that it enables 
one to model the effects of the covariates on the location, scale and shape of the conditional 
wage distribution, unlike the linear regression model (least squares) that only allows one to 
look at the effect on the location (the conditional mean).  
  Training receipts can have a cumulative effect on wages. Since we do not have the 
entire history of training receipts for individuals in our sample, we include the wage from 
wave 1 as an additional regressor in the QR framework in order to take into account the role 
played by the past training receipts in the accumulation of additional human capital.
8 This 
also enables us to control for possible time-invariant individual specific unobservable effects 
in this framework.
9  
                                                 
6   There is an extensive literature on the evaluation of particular labour market programmes, using a variety 
of techniques. For example, see Heckman et al. (1994) look at the average effects of training on the 
treated, Heckman et al (1997) look at the distribution of treatment effects using a non instrumental variable 
(IV) framework, and Abadie et al (2002) look at training effect on different quantiles of the wage 
distribution using the IV framework. The variable of interest here is employer provided training and not a 
labour market program and thus we do not treat training as endogenous here. 
7   The linear conditional quantile regression model was first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). For a 
recent survey of these models, see Buchinsky (1998). 
8   There is no information on the complete history of training received by individuals in the sample. All we 
observe is whether or not an individual receives an additional training event at each wave. 
9   In simple panel data models concerned with estimating the effect of training on conditional mean wage, it 
is customary to either first difference the equation prior to estimation or to use within-group deviations to 
account for individual specific unobservables. This route is not open to us, since the difference of the wage Training and Wages 
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  We specify the th (0<<1)
10 conditional quantile of the log wage (w) distribution for 
the i-th individual (i=1,.., n) in wave t (t=2,..,Ti) as 
 Quant(wit|xit, Dit, wi1xit
’Dit + 	 wi1    

implying  
  wit = xit
’+ Dit + 	 wi1 + uit       ( 2 )  
 with  Quant(uit|xit, Dit, wi10.    
 
In the above specifications, (i) wi1 is the log wage from wave 1 which is included to take into 
account the initial conditions as discussed above, (ii) Dit is the cumulative count of 
completed courses since the first wave of the sample and therefore increases by one every 
year when there the individual is in receipt of training between the two waves.  This model is 
estimated on the pooled sample of men. Because of the definition of the training variable 
used in the model, individuals stay in the sample continuously until they fail to give an 
interview, which results in an unbalanced panel with different individuals contributing 
different numbers of observations. 
Note that, if the underlying model were truly a location model - in the sense that the 
changes in explanatory variables causing only a change in the location of the distribution of 
w and not in the shape of the distribution - then all the slope coefficients would be the same 
for all .
11 
  We use Stata 8  to estimate the coefficients of our QR model. The standard errors are 
calculated using the bootstrap method using 500 replications.   
 
                                                                                                                                                     
quantile is not the same as the quantile of the differenced wage. 
10   =0.5 refers to the Median.  
11   Quantile regression models are more general than simple linear regression model allowing for 
heteroskedastic errors, since the QR model allows for more general dependence of the distribution of w 
(the dependent variable) on the xs instead of just the mean and the variance alone. Training and Wages 
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3.  THE DATA AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
Our data are from the first six waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), 
a large-scale survey collected annually since 1994 in a standardised format that facilitates 
cross-country comparisons. However, we have five waves for Austria and four waves for 
Finland, as they joined the ECHP after 1994. For Britain we use only the first five waves 
because the format of the training question altered from 1998 onwards, as explained in 
Booth and Bryan (2002). 
    In earlier work using the ECHP, we found that training incidence is typically 
significantly higher in the EU public sector than the private (Arulampalam, Booth and 
Bryan, 2003). This finding came as no surprise, since private sector firms are more likely 
than the public sector to be constrained by the need to make profits, and so they may be less 
willing to finance training through fears of losing trained workers to rival non-training firms 
(Booth, 1991). Since various theories about human capital acquisition and its impact on 
earnings have been formulated with private-sector profit maximisation in mind, we focus 
only on the private sector in this study.
12  We also consider only men, although in a 
subsequent study we investigate the gender wage gap using QR techniques and the ECHP 
data.
 13     
  We wish to avoid conflating work-related or ‘continuing training’ with initial 
vocational education or training.
14 We therefore exclude from our analysis individuals under 
                                                 
12   Moreover, our preliminary testing showed that it is inappropriate to pool private and public sector workers 
since the coefficients across the sub-groups differ significantly, as might be expected given that public and 
private sector employers typically have different objective functions.   
13   The reason we focus only on men is that we wish to avoid selectivity issues that we would need to address 
when investigating women. Consequently we are able to concentrate in this study on a careful and 
thorough investigation of private sector male wages that will inform our subsequent analysis.  
14   Despite the harmonisation of the ECHP, what respondents report as training may depend partly on the very 
heterogeneous country-specific vocational training and education systems. However, cross-country 
comparisons of continuing training – the measure we use in our analysis - are likely to be more robust for 
two reasons. First, there is typically much less regulation of continuing training than initial training and 
education. Second, the incidence of general education after age 25 is very low (typically less than 2%), so 
there is little danger of confusing training and education.  Training and Wages 
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the age of 25 years, paid apprentices, and those on special employment-related training 
schemes.
15  
  For each country, our estimating sub-sample comprises employed private sector men 
who are: (i) between the ages of 25 and 54 years and working at least 15 hours per week; (ii) 
not employed in agriculture; (iii) employed in the private sector; and (iv) with valid 
observations on all the variables used in the wage equations; and (v) with sequences of 
continuous observations starting from the first wave in the sample in order to have a 
complete training record (see also Data Appendix). Individuals can be present for a 
minimum of two waves (including the first wave) and a maximum of six waves for all 
countries except for Austria and Britain (where the maximum is five) and Finland (where the 
maximum is four).
16  
The restriction of working at least 15 hours per week was necessary because of the 
nature of the ECHP data, where – in the first two waves – we were unable to distinguish 
individuals regularly working fewer than 15 hours from those out-of-the labour force. In 
addition, some important variables like firm size and tenure are only available for individuals 
working 15 hours or more. Thus our estimating sub-samples will under-represent low-hours 
part-timers (though for most countries these represent only a tiny fraction of male 
workers).
17 We include in our analysis the ten European countries listed in Table 1 and 
estimate the models using pooled person-year observations.
18 
                                                 
15   Apprentices and those on special training schemes account for only 1.1% of the sampled age group. 
16   Because we need a complete record of training for each individual, we drop any observations, which 
follow a break in the data. Therefore, if an individual is observed in waves 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, we use waves 1, 
2 and 3 only. 
17   Exceptions are Britain (6.2% of the sub-sample), the Netherlands (8.8%) and Ireland (4.0%). In all other 
countries the proportion of low-hours part-timers is under 3%.  
18   We omit Greece and Portugal from our estimation owing to apparent gaps in the training data and because 
of the smaller estimating sub-samples with usable information. We also omit Germany because the data 
sets supplied as part of the ECHP have shortcomings for our analysis: the six wave data set derived from 
the GSOEP survey excludes many shorter training spells (communication from DIW), whilst in the 
original three-wave ECHP data set, interview dates are treated as confidential, so it is not possible to 
construct job tenure or know whether training was before or after the previous interview. Training and Wages 
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The dependent variable is the log of the average hourly wage, including overtime 
payments, in the respondent’s main job.
19 The characteristics of each country’s 
unconditional log wage distribution, deflated to 1999 prices, are reported in Table 1. The 
deflators are the European Union’s harmonised indices of consumer prices (HICP; see 
Eurostat Yearbook, 2002). To facilitate cross-country comparisons of consumption wages, 
the log wage figures were converted to purchasing power parity (PPP) units, using the 
scaling factors supplied with the ECHP. The first column shows substantial variation in 
mean wages across countries, from a high of 2.7 log points in the Netherlands down to 2.1 
log points in Spain (with 2.2 log points in Italy). But there are also differences in the 
dispersion of wages, as shown by the standard deviations in the second column. By this 
measure, the country with the lowest dispersion (0.031) is Denmark (which has the second 
highest mean wage, 2.69 log points), whilst Ireland has the highest dispersion (0.52). It is 
notable that Spain has the lowest mean and one of the highest standard deviations, 0.51. The 
remaining columns show the median, the 10
th and 90
th percentiles, and in the last column the 
difference between the 90
th and the 10
th percentiles. This measure of dispersion shows a 
similar pattern to the standard deviation: Britain, Ireland and Spain stand out as countries 
with high hourly wage dispersion. 
The form of the training question is as follows: “Have you at any time since January 
(in the previous year) been in vocational education or training, including any part-time or 
short courses?”. Since this reference period may overlap with the reference period of the 
previous wave, and to avoid counting long events more than once, where possible we use the 
start and end dates of the course to identify distinct training events.
20 We then construct our 
                                                 
19   The log wage was calculated from the ECHP variables as log (wage) = log (PI211MG * (12/52) / PE005A) 
= log (normal gross monthly earnings from main job including overtime * (12/52) / hours in main job 
including overtime). No specific information is provided on overtime hours and premia. 
20   The modal interview month is October, corresponding to a reference period of 22 months. The British data 
do not include training dates. However they are derived from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 
where the reference period only slightly exceeds one year. Since events are generally very short in Britain, Training and Wages 
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training variable Dit as the cumulative count of completed courses since the first wave of the 
sample. Most studies simply examine the impact of training incidence (and sometimes 
intensity) on wages, but not the number of events.
21 We follow Lillard and Tan (1992) in 
using the accumulated sum of all training events, where there is only one event measured at 
each wave owing to the nature of our data. 
The framing of the training question suggests that the training responses should be 
interpreted as more formal courses of instruction, rather than informal on-the-job training 
(for which we control – at least in part – using job tenure). A separate question asks about 
“general or higher education”. Participation in these more general courses is very low 
(average annual take-up by 25-54 year olds is less than 1%) so we are confident that our 
results are not affected by interactions with countries’ differing formal educational systems. 
Table 2 reports information about completed training courses for private sector men 
by country. The first column gives the number of observations for each country, while the 
second column reports the mean number of waves for each country.
22  The third column 
reports training incidence for completed courses only. For example, the first row of Table 2 
shows that the Austrian sub-sample comprises 804 private sector men who are observed in 
three waves on average and of whom 15% have completed a training course in any year. The 
mean accumulated training count is simply the product of the second and third columns. The 
figures in the third column show that training incidence differs considerably across 
countries. We can identify three high-incidence countries – Britain, Denmark and Finland – 
where each year over 30% of individuals complete training courses. In contrast Austria, 
                                                                                                                                                     
there should be little chance of double counting. For France, we do not use training dates as they are 
missing for the majority of events. 
21  Exceptions are Lillard and Tan (1992), Arulampalam, Booth and Elias, (1997), Blundell et al. (1999) 
Arulampalam and Booth (2001), and Booth and Bryan (2002). Lillard and Tan (1992: p31) note that 
multiple training occurrences within a period are typically not known from US survey data.   
22    As explained earlier, individuals can be present for a minimum of two waves and a maximum of six waves 
for all countries except for Austria and Britain (where the maximum is five) and Finland (where the 
maximum is four).  Training and Wages 
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Belgium and France form a group of medium-incidence countries, where each year between 
10% and 15% of men complete training courses. Finally, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Spain have incidence below 10%.  
Though our sample is limited to men in the private sector, the cross-country pattern 
summarised in Table 2 is similar to that found in analysis of overall training (Arulampalam, 
Booth and Bryan, 2003). The ranking also compares reasonably well (especially for the high 
incidence countries) with the cross-country comparisons using different data sources 
reported in OECD (1999); and with International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) data on 
continuing training for several countries featured in OECD (2003).  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1   Returns to Training 
Table 3 reports the quantile regression estimates for the returns to training (the derivative of 
the conditional quantile or mean wage with respect to training), as measured by the 
coefficient on the training receipt dummy, for five different values of (0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 
and 0.90). The other controls are human capital, demographic and job characteristics 
expected to affect earnings. We include dummy variables for age and job tenure bands, any 
unemployment experienced since 1989, marital status, health problems affecting daily life, 
highest educational levels, fixed term or casual employment, part-time work, establishment 
size, one-digit occupation and industry, year and, where the data allow, region.  We also 
include a separate control for training started in the current year but uncompleted at the 
survey date. Dummies were also included for cases where there were a very large number of 
missing values (see Data Appendix).  To facilitate comparison with the usual procedure, 
which estimates the impact of training on the expected wage, we report the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates in the first column of Table 3. In Figure 1 we also present the Training and Wages 
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estimated returns for each of the quantiles of the log wage distribution along with the 95% 
confidence band around the estimates. Superimposed on the plots is a dotted horizontal line 
representing the OLS estimate of the effect of training on expected log wages. 
  Table 3 reveals an interesting pattern of estimated returns to training. The estimated 
returns to the expected wage (the OLS results) vary from the highest, of around 5.9% in 
Ireland, to the lowest and statistically insignificant returns in Belgium and Italy. We next 
turn to the QR estimates of the returns to training. As noted earlier, if it is found that 
investment in training yields similar percentage returns across the conditional wage 
distribution, this would imply that training only has an effect on the location of this 
conditional wage distribution. 
Inspection of the returns to training at different quantiles of the conditional wage 
distribution is more illuminating than the simple OLS estimation. For example, France and 
Ireland are the only countries where the estimated returns to training are significantly 
different from zero at all quantiles, with Ireland enjoying much larger returns compared to 
France. Unlike OLS, QR estimates are robust to outliers. This is clearly brought out in the 
estimates for Netherlands where the return to the conditional mean wage is about 3% and 
significant, whilst the QR estimates reveal that the returns are insignificant in all quantiles. 
In this case the significance found in OLS results is entirely driven by a small group of 
outliers. If the 0.5% of observations with the highest and lowest residuals are excluded, the 
coefficient falls to 0.008 with a standard error of 0.006, very similar to the median estimates. 
Returns to training in Italy are insignificant at all quantiles and in Belgium there is a 
significant 2.4% returns estimated at the 0.25
th quantile. Interestingly, we find training to 
increase the dispersion of the conditional wage distribution in Austria, ceteris paribus. A 
broadly similar result was found for Britain.  Training and Wages 
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Homogeneity in returns to training would imply that the figures are flat so that it is 
possible to draw a horizontal line within the confidence interval band. Inspection of the plots 
in Figure 1 and the estimates in Table 3  reveals that, in all countries apart from Belgium, the 
conditional distribution of wages with training is no more dispersed than in the case without 
training. This is also confirmed by the test of equality of (returns to training) coefficients at 
the 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.90 quantiles presented in Table 4. For Belgium the F-statistic 
implies a rejection of this equality hypothesis at the 5% level (F(4,1760)=2.78), whereas in 
the other countries one cannot reject equality at conventional significance levels. The 
remaining F statistics are from pair-wise equality tests. As expected, in Belgium several of 
these statistics imply a strong rejection of pair-wise equality. But there is also some evidence 
of rejection of pair-wise equality in two of the other countries, France and Ireland, as 
inspection of Tables 3 and 4 makes clear.  
We noted earlier that, in a perfectly competitive labour market, there are good 
reasons to expect that percentage returns to investment in general training might be the same 
across the conditional wage distribution for workers of identical ability. Our QR estimates 
summarised in Table 3 and Figure 1 show that, for the vast majority of our countries, there is 
no statistically significant difference between the conditional distributions for those with 
training compared to those without.  
As noted earlier, if there are significant complementarities between unobservable 
productivity and work-related training, then higher productivity individuals – further to the 
right in the conditional wage distribution – should have higher returns to training. Yet this is 
found in our data only for Austria and Britain, as illustrated in Figure 1, where the effects are 
not, however, significantly different from each other across the conditional wage 
distribution. Indeed, the only country with a significant effect is Belgium, where the reverse 
is found – individuals further to the left in the conditional distribution have higher returns to Training and Wages 
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training - suggesting that unobservable productivity and work-related training are not 
complements.  
As noted in the introduction, some recent papers argue that imperfect competition in 
the labour market might lead firms to finance general training provided a worker’s 
productivity is increasing in training more quickly than wages. To the extent this ‘wedge’ is 
unobservable in survey data, then we would expect to see variations from the average returns 
to training across different quantiles of the conditional wage distribution, reflecting 
variations in wages due to monopsony power and the degree to which firms have financed 
such training and are reaping the returns. For example, workers subject to greater 
monopsony power may have lower than expected wages, and the firm will take a larger share 
of the returns to any training. Therefore, the estimated training effects on wages should 
increase as we move up the conditional wage distribution.  
Moreover, if some firms offer skills packages that are more specific than others, we 
would also expect variations in individual returns across the conditional wage distribution 
reflecting unobservable skill specificity in both formal and informal training. Yet in our 
estimates we observe remarkably little heterogeneity in returns across the conditional 
distribution for each country.  
While our results may be consistent with the hypothesis that, in a perfectly 
competitive labour market, percentage returns to investment in general training will be the 
same across the conditional wage distribution, we believe that it is hard to argue that 
European labour markets fit the competitive paradigm. An alternative interpretation is that 
the effects of firm-specific and individual-specific unobservables wash out, and that their net 
effect is therefore uniform across the conditional wage distribution. Variations in skill-mix 
(from specific to general) and in labour market imperfections, coupled with unobserved Training and Wages 
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individual-specific productivity, most likely contribute to our finding of no consistent pattern 
across the conditional wage distribution. 
In summary, our results for the training effect suggest that the way in which 
unobservables interact with training receipts is fairly uniform across the conditional wage 
distribution within a country. Moreover, this finding was repeated for the vast majority of the 
EU countries we investigated. Only Belgium was an outlier in this respect. This is an 
interesting result, and one that is counter to the results found for education in other studies - 
and in our own - and we return to this issue in the next sub-section. However, our results do 
suggest that there are considerable differences in mean returns to training across countries, 
and it is to these estimates that we now turn. 
The OLS estimates of the mean returns to each completed training event are given in 
the first column of Table 3. The three countries with the highest training incidence – Britain, 
Denmark and Finland – are also amongst the countries with the lowest returns, of 
approximately one percent per event. Ireland has by far the highest mean returns (nearly 6 
percent) to each completed training event, followed by France, Spain and Austria, all of 
whom have statistically significant returns to each event of over 2 percent. For Belgium, 
however, it is more appropriate to use the QR estimates, since returns to training across the 
various quantiles of the Belgian conditional wage distribution are significantly different from 
each other. The Netherlands is a special case, since as noted earlier, the significant mean 
return found is entirely driven by outliers. 
 
4.2   Returns to Education 
Education is categorised according to the International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED), where Levels 0-2 cover less than upper secondary education, level 3 is upper 
secondary education (e.g. GCE A-levels, baccalauréat) and levels 5-7 cover tertiary Training and Wages 
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education, both university and non-university.  The dummy variables Educ2 and Educ3 refer 
to the ISCED-Level 3 and ISCED-levels-5-7 respectively.
23  
  We report the results for the estimated returns to education in Table 5. In all cases, as 
expected, there are positive returns to education: accumulation of human capital via 
education shifts the wage distribution to the right, ceteris paribus. In addition, our QR 
estimates show that the conditional distribution differs for educated individuals compared to 
the less educated.  This finding is consistent with the idea that there are complementarities 
between unobservable ability (or productivity) and education, since higher ability individuals 
– further to the right in the conditional wage distribution – have higher returns to education. 
This result is found for the vast majority of our countries and for both 2
nd and 3
rd levels of 
higher levels of education.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS   
In this paper we used quantile regression techniques to investigate the degree to which work-
related training affects the location, scale and shape of the conditional wage distribution. 
Human capital theory suggests that the percentage returns to training investments will be the 
same across the conditional wage distribution. Other theories – whether based on 
imperfections in the labour market or on skill-mix heterogeneity – suggest that this need not 
be the case.  Using the first six waves of the European Community Household Panel, we 
investigated these issues for private sector men in ten European Union countries. Our results 
for training suggest that, for the vast majority of countries, investment in training yields 
similar percentage returns across the conditional wage distribution. In other words, the way 
unobservables interact with training receipts appears fairly uniform across the conditional 
wage distribution. Only Belgium was an outlier in this respect.  
                                                 
23   ISCED-level-4 is not separately identified in this dataset. Training and Wages 
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While this finding is consistent with orthodox general human capital theory, which 
assumes a perfectly competitive labour market for workers of identical unobservable 
productivity, we believe it is hard to argue that European labour markets fit the competitive 
paradigm. An alternative interpretation is that the effects of firm-specific and individual-
specific unobservables wash out, and that their net effect is therefore uniform across the 
conditional wage distribution. Variations in skill-mix (from specific to general) and in labour 
market imperfections, coupled with unobserved individual-specific productivity, most likely 
contribute to our finding of no consistent pattern across the conditional wage distribution. 
However, our results do suggest that there are considerable differences in mean 
returns to training across countries. The three countries with the highest training incidence – 
Britain, Denmark and Finland – are also amongst the countries with the lowest returns, of 
approximately one percent per event. Ireland has by far the highest mean returns (nearly 6 
percent) to each completed training event, followed by France, Spain and Austria, all of 
whom have statistically significant returns to each event of over 2 percent. Belgium is the 
only country for which it is more appropriate to use the QR estimates, since returns to 
training across the various quantiles of the Belgian conditional wage distribution are 
significantly different from each other. 
We also find that there are positive returns to education and that education shifts the 
wage distribution to the right. In addition, the returns at the upper parts of the distribution are 
much higher than at the lower parts of the distribution, implying that education also 
increases wage dispersion. This finding is consistent with the idea that there are 
complementarities between unobservable ability (or productivity) and education, since 
higher ability individuals – further to the right in the conditional wage distribution – have 
higher returns to education.  Training and Wages 
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Our QR estimates of the training returns across the conditional wage distribution 
offer an interesting way forward. In future work it would be interesting to estimate these 
models using linked employer-employee data in order to ascertain the relative importance of 
firm-specific and individual specific unobservables. 
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Austria  2.330 0.384 2.301 1.929  2.807  0.878 
Belgium  2.468 0.349 2.434 2.072  2.927  0.854 
Britain  2.432 0.463 2.425 1.863  3.014  1.151 
Denmark  2.689 0.311 2.651 2.336  3.123  0.786 
Finland  2.326 0.395 2.279 1.905  2.838  0.933 
France  2.201 0.458 2.157 1.696  2.789  1.093 
Ireland   2.357 0.522 2.356 1.792  2.973  1.181 
Italy  2.190 0.338 2.154 1.834  2.609  0.775 
Netherlands  2.700 0.406 2.667 2.330  3.142  0.812 
Spain  2.132 0.510 2.068 1.554  2.805  1.251 
Notes:  The log wage was calculated from the ECHP variables as log (wage) = log (PI211MG * 
(12/52) / PE005A) = log (normal gross monthly earnings from main job including overtime * (12/52) 
/ hours in main job including overtime). It was then deflated to 1999 prices using harmonised indices 
of consumer prices (HICP) from the Eurostat Yearbook 2002, and converted to purchasing power 
parity (PPP) units using the ECHP variable PPPxx (where xx is the year). 
 
Table 2: Training Participation across Europe for Private Sector Men in 
Employment Aged 25-54 Years 
 




















Austria  804  3.00 0.15 0.45 
Belgium  603  3.00 0.10 0.31 
Britain  1001  3.40 0.38 1.31 
Denmark  715  3.44 0.38 1.31 
Finland  788  2.37 0.32 0.77 
France  1557  3.42 0.13 0.49 
Ireland   598  3.23 0.05 0.17 
Italy  1306  3.44 0.05 0.16 
Netherlands  1288  3.90 0.06 0.24 
Spain  1324  3.31 0.08 0.25 
 
Note: column [3] reports the average proportion of men who have completed a training course since the 
previous interview; column [4] indicates the mean number of courses completed over the panel (which equals 
the product of  columns [2] and [3]). 
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Table 3 – Estimated Returns to Training 
 
 
  OLS 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
 Austria  0.0228




  (2.97) (0.29)  (0.87) (2.16) (2.30)  (2.09) 
 Belgium  0.0072 0.0315  0.0238
** 0.0053  -0.0163  -0.0250 
  (0.80) (1.57)  (2.49) (0.64) (1.37)  (1.16) 
 Britain  0.0090
* -0.0008 0.0033  0.0091
* 0.0130
** 0.0137 
  (1.77) (0.10)  (0.59) (1.79) (2.08)  (1.39) 
 Denmark  0.0083
** 0.0088 0.0054  0.0091
** 0.0095
** 0.0087 
  (2.30) (1.34)  (1.17) (2.44) (1.97)  (1.26) 
 Finland  0.0148
** 0.0219
** 0.0123
** 0.0102  0.0123 0.0059 
  (2.11) (2.04)  (1.97) (1.48) (1.16)  (0.55) 







  (5.48) (4.88)  (3.92) (4.91) (4.73)  (3.88) 






  (3.96) (2.85)  (3.62) (4.64) (2.83)  (1.26) 
 Italy  0.0126 0.0099  0.0090 0.0148 0.0173  0.0172 
  (1.56) (0.71)  (0.76) (1.22) (1.34)  (1.03) 
 Netherlands  0.0273
***  0.0067  0.0057 0.0078 0.0115  0.0177 
  (2.63) (0.71)  (0.76) (1.21) (1.29)  (1.54) 
 Spain  0.0233




 (2.79)  (1.09)  (3.32)  (3.45)  (1.90)  (0.95) 
 
  Notes: (i) The model includes the wage in the first wave, dummies for whether training is still in 
progress, age, education, tenure, marital status, health status, any experience of unemployment since 
1989, presence of children under 12, part-time status, fixed term and casual contracts, firm size, 
occupation, region (where possible), industry and year. Dummies were also included for cases where 
there were a very large number of missing values. (ii) Asterisks denote level of significance: * 10%, ** 
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Table 4 – F tests of Equality of Returns to Training 
   
 = 0.25 
 
 = 0.50 
 
 = 0.75 
 
 = 0.90 
Test of joint equality of all 
coefficients on the training variable 
Austria         F(4,2366)=0.82 
 = 0.10   0.17    1.50  2.16   2.11   
 = 0.25    1.59   2.08    1.96   
 = 0.50     0.60  0.74   
 = 0.75       0.18   
Belgium          F( 4, 1760) = 2.78** 
 = 0.10   0.22    1.90    4.91**   4.11**   
 = 0.25     4.93**    10.13***    5.09**   
 = 0.50      4.08**    2.14   
 = 0.75       0.21   
Britain          F(4, 3351) = 0.70 
 = 0.10    0.41    1.65    2.25    1.44   
 = 0.25     1.58    1.90    0.95   
 = 0.50      0.45    0.22   
 = 0.75       0.01   
Denmark          F(4, 2414) = 0.26 
 = 0.10   0.36    0.00    0.01   0.00   
 = 0.25     0.75    0.53    0.17   
 = 0.50      0.01    0.00   
 = 0.75       0.02   
Finland          F(4,1821) = 0.39 
 = 0.10   1.00    1.12    0.49   1.12   
 = 0.25     0.11    0.00    0.28   
 = 0.50      0.06    0.14   
 = 0.75       0.33   
France          F(4, 5267) = 1.22 
 = 0.10    4.61**    2.22  0.92    0.74   
 = 0.25     0.36    0.95    0.56   
 = 0.50      0.43    0.18   
 = 0.75       0.00   
Ireland      F(4,  1885)  =  1.19 
 = 0.10   0.46    0.08    0.66   0.72   
 = 0.25     1.76    0.13    0.30   
 = 0.50      3.40*    1.80   
 = 0.75       0.15   
Italy      F(4,  4433)  =  0.10 
 = 0.10   0.01    0.11    0.21   0.14   
 = 0.25     0.26    0.37    0.20   
 = 0.50      0.05    0.02   
 = 0.75       0.00   
Netherlands      F(4,  4971)  =  0.23 
 = 0.10    0.01    0.01    0.15    0.53   
 = 0.25     0.10    0.37    0.88   
 = 0.50      0.26    0.74   
 = 0.75       0.36   
Spain      F(4,  4332)  =  1.07 
 = 0.10   1.70    1.04    0.05   0.04   
 = 0.25     0.03    1.40    1.84   
 = 0.50      1.77    1.91   
 = 0.75      0.41   
Notes: Asterisks denote level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Training and Wages 
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OLS 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
 Austria  2




    (1.17) (1.05) (1.99) (2.68) (2.79) (0.52) 
  3
rd level  0.0668
** 0.0628  0.0567
* 0.0571  0.1274
*** 0.1171
* 
    (2.41) (1.36) (1.81) (1.53) (2.78) (1.71) 
 Belgium  2
nd level  0.0113  -0.0182 0.0013 0.0147 0.0052 0.0259 
    (0.96) (0.95) (0.09) (1.15) (0.32) (1.04) 
  3







    (4.95) (2.09) (2.67) (3.68) (3.72) (3.68) 
 Britain  2
nd level  -0.0303




    (2.09) (0.70) (0.68) (1.97) (1.92) (1.83) 
  3
rd level  0.0046  -0.0001 0.0111  -0.0056 0.0028 0.0079 
    (0.38) (0.01) (0.74) (0.54) (0.20) (0.33) 
 Denmark  2
nd level  0.0243
**  -0.0181 0.0142 0.0127 0.0303
** 0.0704
***
    (2.27) (1.07) (1.34) (1.11) (2.19) (2.79) 
  3






    (4.49) (0.39) (2.95) (2.38) (3.65) (4.73) 
 Finland  2
nd level  0.0347
** 0.0771
*** 0.0386
**  0.0138 0.0074 0.0091 
    (2.45) (2.94) (2.38) (0.97) (0.42) (0.39) 
  3




** 0.0290  0.0386 
    (3.21) (2.35) (3.24) (2.44) (1.26) (1.12) 
 France  2







    (5.47) (3.75) (5.31) (4.04) (4.21) (4.72) 
  3







    (11.86) (7.66)  (10.29) (6.68) (7.48) (6.95) 
 Ireland  2
nd level  0.0359




    (2.37) (1.07) (0.85) (1.78) (2.14) (1.86) 
  3







    (5.35) (2.45) (4.88) (4.33) (3.24) (3.63) 
 Italy  2
nd level  0.0111 0.0365
*** 0.0305
*** 0.0197
** 0.0142  0.0012 
    (1.45) (2.65) (3.37) (2.43) (1.32) (0.09) 
  3







    (6.56) (5.12) (7.44) (4.33) (3.60) (2.62) 
 Netherlands  2
nd level  0.0280
**  0.0034  -0.0015  -0.0001 0.0123 0.0336
***
    (2.03) (0.22) (0.18) (0.02) (1.41) (2.76) 
  3







    (9.09) (4.16) (4.44) (4.39) (6.10) (6.11) 
 Spain  2







    (4.01) (3.25) (2.45) (2.73) (3.22) (1.75) 
  3







    (6.68) (4.16) (4.66) (4.91) (5.20) (4.88) 
 
Notes: (i) The model includes the wage in the first wave, accumulated training, dummies for 
whether training is still in progress, age, tenure, marital status, health status, any experience of 
unemployment since 1989, presence of children under 12, part-time status, fixed term and casual 
contracts, firm size, occupation, region (where possible), industry and year. Dummies were also 
included for cases where there were a very large number of missing values. (ii) Asterisks denote 
level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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DATA APPENDIX: Selection of estimating samples    
 
Unless otherwise stated, we applied the initial selection described in Section 3 of the text. 
We then dropped observations with missing or invalid data on the variables in the wage 
equations, that is principally: training, fixed term or casual contract, occupation, industry, 
region, establishment size, tenure, part-time status, education, health status, marital status 
and presence of children. Where the number of missing values was substantial, we also 
included a dummy variable for missing value observations in order to preserve the sample 
sizes. Finally, we kept only continuous sequences of observations from the first wave 
(usually ECHP wave 1) to ensure a complete record of training for each individual. The 
table details the number of observations remaining at each of these selection stages. 
 
Country   Initial no. 
of obs 
after first 
























3189 3029      3-6  2413  [804]  . 
Belgium 
 
3406 2680    Size    2-6  1809  [603]  . 
Britain 
 


















3249 3126    Industry  2-6  2461  [715]   
Finland 
 
2386 2282    Industry, 
Occupation 
4-6 1871  [788]   
France 
 










2729 2643    Region  2-6  1932  [598]   
Italy 
 
6944 6173      2-6  4489  [1306]   
Netherlands 
 
7038 6719    Industry  2-6  5017  [1288] No  training 





6445 6296    Region  2-6  4384  [1324]   
  
 